What is a Merciful Heart? Affective-Motivational Aspects of the Second Love Command by Vitz, Rico
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 34 | Issue 3 Article 3
7-1-2017
What Is A Merciful Heart? AffectiveMotivational:
Aspects Of The Second Love Command
Rico Vitz
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.
Recommended Citation
Vitz, Rico (2017) "What Is A Merciful Heart? AffectiveMotivational: Aspects Of The Second Love Command," Faith and Philosophy:
Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 34 : Iss. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol34/iss3/3
“WHAT IS A MERCIFUL HEART?”:  
AFFECTIVE-MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF  
THE SECOND LOVE COMMAND
Rico Vitz
In this paper, I argue that Christ’s second love command implies not only 
that people’s volitions and actions be Christ-like, but also that their affective-
motivational dispositions be Christ-like. More specifically, I argue that the 
command implies that people have aretaic obligations to strive to cultivate a 
merciful heart with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria 
in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., one that is disposed to becoming inflamed, 
such that it is gripped by “strong and vehement mercy.”
In what is perhaps one of the most familiar passages of the Gospel, Christ 
explains what ought to be the central focus of human life. In response to 
a question from a Pharisee regarding the greatest commandment of the 
Law, He replies that the entirety of “the Law and the Prophets” hangs on 
two commandments. The first and greatest command is to love the Lord 
God with all one’s heart, with all one’s soul, and with all one’s mind. The 
second command is to love one’s neighbor as oneself (Matt 22:26–40; Mark 
12:28–31; Luke 10:25–27; cf. Gal 5:14).
Given the recurring presentation of these commandments in the Gospels, 
in the writings of St. Paul, and in the Christian tradition, identifying what 
ought to be the central focus of human life as taught by Christ seems like a 
rather easy task. Understanding and explaining Christ’s teaching, however, 
is another matter. What exactly does the second love command entail? 
Two responses seem most prominent.
The first suggests that the scope of Christ’s second love command entails 
certain kinds of operations of a person’s cognitive and volitional facul-
ties but not of a person’s affective-motivational faculties. For instance, in 
his discussion of the second love command in Justice in Love, Wolterstorff 
offers a thoughtful account of the command as one requiring love as care 
but not requiring the cultivation of certain kinds of affective-motivational 
dispositions.1 Segments of popular Christian discourse echo this theme, 
1See, e.g., Wolterstorff, Justice in Love, 80–84, 98–99, 101ff., 116–118. It is worth noting that 
Wolterstorff suggests both that (1) it is “appropriate” for a person to have eros, or attraction 
love, for his or her neighbor, and that (2) compassionate love is the example Jesus offers for 
“what he is looking for” (Justice in Love, 109, 118). I’m not quite sure what to make of these 
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teaching, for example, that love “is not a feeling but a determined act of will, 
which always results in determined acts of self-giving.”2 Thus, some un-
derstand the second love command as a precept demanding only certain 
types of cognition, volition, and action.
The second suggests that the scope of Christ’s second love command 
includes not only certain kinds of operations of a person’s cognitive and 
volitional faculties but also something concerning the condition of the per-
son’s affective-motivational faculties. What is this “something”? There is 
little if any contemporary philosophical work that offers an answer to the 
question concerning what the command prescribes with respect to a 
person’s affective-motivational faculties.3 Thus, among contemporary 
Christians in general and among Christian philosophers in particular, 
there seem to be two views, neither of which affirms and explains the 
affective-motivational aspects of the second love command.
This state of affairs strikes me as rather problematic. In response, I will 
argue that the second love command prescribes not merely that people 
cultivate Christ-like cognitive and volitional dispositions and but also that 
they cultivate Christ-like affective-motivational dispositions. In fact, I am 
going to argue for an even stronger thesis: namely, that Christ commands 
Christians, as a rule, to strive to cultivate a merciful heart, one disposed to 
the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of Syria (c. 613–700 A.D.). 
In his 71st ascetical homily, St. Isaac asks rhetorically, “What is a merciful 
heart?” He answers as follows:
It is the heart’s burning desire for the sake of the entire creation, for men, for 
birds, for animals, for demons, and for every created thing; and at the recol-
lection and sight of them, the eyes of a merciful man pour forth abundant 
tears. From the strong and vehement mercy that grips his heart and from his 
claims. When he says that it is “appropriate” for a person to have attraction love for one’s 
neighbor, is he saying that having attraction love for one’s neighbor is an aspect of human 
excellence? Similarly, when he says that compassionate love is what Jesus “is looking for,” is 
he saying that Christ is calling us to strive to embody compassionate love? If the answer to 
both of these questions is “yes,” then our views might be similar. I find it difficult, however, 
to square affirmative answers to these questions with Wolterstorff’s claims that “Jesus is 
silent about motives for love” and that motives do not matter (Justice in Love, 116–118). If the 
answer to either of these questions is “no,” then our views are more starkly different. In any 
event, Justice in Love is an important work, and I am grateful to an anonymous referee for 
calling it to my attention.
2MacArthur, “Is Biblical Love a Feeling or an Action?,” emphasis mine. In this, one hears 
an echo of Kant’s claim that love of others “considered as an inclination”—that is, as a mo-
tivating affection—is possible, “but cannot be commanded, for it is not in the power of any 
man to love anyone at command; therefore, it is only practical love that is meant in that pith 
of all laws” (Critique of Practical Reason, I.i.3). It is worth noting, though, that Kant’s view 
itself is much more nuanced. For instance, in Metaphysics of Morals II.i.1, §34, he claims that 
people do have a “conditional duty” to sympathize with others—that is, to share the feelings 
of others by an exercise of practical reason. Thus, there seems to be a sense in which Kant 
believes affections have some proper place in human action. How best to interpret Kant, 
however, is not essential to my argument.
3Howard-Snyder recognizes this broader scope of the command but denies knowing 
what the command entails concerning the operations of a person’s affective faculties—see, 
e.g., Howard-Snyder, “On These Two Commandments,” 17.
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great compassion, his heart is humbled, and he cannot bear to hear or to see 
any injury or slight sorrow in creation. For this reason, he offers up prayers 
with tears continually even for irrational beasts, for the enemies of the truth, 
and for those who harm him, that they may be protected and receive mercy. 
And in like manner he even prays for the family of reptiles, because of the 
great compassion that burns without measure in his heart in the likeness of God.4
In other words, I am going to argue that the second love command pre-
scribes not simply that people’s actions be Christ-like, nor only that their 
minds and wills be Christ-like, but that their entire psyches, or souls, be 
Christ-like.5
I will develop my case for this thesis in three parts, as follows. In Sec-
tion I, I will offer a scriptural and patristic interpretation of the second 
love command. In Section II, I will engage in a process of fides quaerens 
intellectum and offer a philosophical interpretation of the scriptural and 
patristic understanding of the second love command. In Section III, I will 
conclude by summarizing my argument and suggesting its implications 
for future research.
I. A Scriptural and Patristic Interpretation of the Second Love Command
What is the scriptural and patristic understanding of the second love 
command? Perhaps the most important way of seeking an answer to that 
question is by examining the kind of love for neighbor that was exempli-
fied both by (1) Christ’s life and teachings and (2) the lives and teachings 
of His disciples. With that method of inquiry in mind, let’s begin by exam-
ining the evidence from sacred scripture and sacred tradition.
I.1 Evidence from Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition
As it relates to my thesis in this paper, one thing in particular stands out 
from the affective aspects of Christ’s interactions with others: his com-
passion. When the Gospel writers say that Christ “had compassion on” 
others, they are not simply noting that He acted benevolently on behalf 
of others, but also that the so-called “irrational powers” of his soul were 
moved. For instance, they present Christ as a man who is moved with 
compassion (splagchnizomai) for those who are hungry (Matt 15:32; Mark 
8:2), in debt (Matt 18:27), harassed and dejected (Matt 9:36), sick (Matt 
14:14), disabled (Matt 20:34), infirmed (Mark 1:41), spiritually adrift (Mark 
6:36), and grieving (Luke 7:13).
4St. Isaac the Syrian, Ascetical Homilies, 491, emphasis mine. For an exposition of St. Isaac’s 
teachings, see Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian; cp. Archimandrite Sophrony’s 
comments on the teaching of St. Silouan the Athonite—Sophrony, St. Silouan the Athonite, 
162–163.
5Notice that my thesis focuses on the depth not the breadth, or scope, of St. Isaac’s concep-
tion of a merciful heart. Thus, the focus of my argument will be on the implications of the 
second love command for cultivating certain kinds of affective-motivational dispositions. 
Whether we can or ought to have such dispositions with respect to higher or lower beings—
e.g., angelic powers or animals—is not something that I will address in this essay. 
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In two cases in particular, the Gospel writers explicitly highlight the 
fact that Christ was moved to tears. The first reveals the depth of Christ’s 
compassion for those who are grieving. The contextual details of this case 
are instructive. The story is from St. John’s Gospel. Jesus was on his way 
to the family of His friend Lazarus, who had been dead for four days. 
Before He reached the town, Lazarus’s sister Martha met him. In an effort 
to console her, He reassured her that Lazarus will rise on the last day, and 
she confessed that He is the Christ. She then went and called her sister 
Mary, who rose quickly to meet Him. When Mary arrived, she fell at His 
feet crying. Then, St. John says, when Jesus saw her weeping and the Jews 
who came with her weeping, He groaned, was troubled, and wept (John 
11:17–35). What is particularly interesting is that the story reveals just how 
deep Christ’s compassion was for those who were grieving: it moved him 
to tears.
The second is similar. St. Luke tells us that as Christ approached 
Jerusalem, where the citizens of the city would plead to have Him killed, 
He “wept over it, saying, ‘If you had known, even you, especially in this 
your day, the things that make for your peace!’” (Luke 19:41–42 NKJV). 
What is particularly intriguing about this story is that it reveals the depth 
of Christ’s compassion not merely for sinners but for enemies who wish 
to do Him harm: it moves him to weep bitterly for their pride and hard-
hardheartedness (cf. Jer 13:17).
Taken together, these two stories illustrate the profound depth and 
scope of Christ’s compassionate love. It stirs Him deeply, to the point of 
tears, both for victims and for sinners, including His enemies.
One might be tempted to think these passages about the depth of 
Christ’s compassion reveal a merely complementary feature to the second 
love command, but this is a temptation that one should resist. Consider the 
way that the Gospel of St. Luke elucidates the command. As I mentioned 
above, in the third Gospel, immediately after stating the love commands, 
Christ introduces the parable of the Good Samaritan to explain who one’s 
neighbor is (Luke 10:29–37) and concludes by exhorting his listeners to “go 
and do likewise.” Notice, however, that the Gospel presents the Christ-like 
figure in the parable (i.e., the Samaritan) as one who is moved with com-
passion (Luke 10:33). In a related and similar vein, the Gospel presents a 
Christ-like figure in the Parable of the Prodigal Son (viz., the father) as one 
who is moved with compassion (Luke 15:20). Thus, the only two times 
that the Gospel of St. Luke uses the term ‘compassion’ (splagchnizomai) in 
reference to someone other than Christ, it is to illustrate the kind of love 
one ought to have for others, both for victims and for sinners.
The New Testament does not merely present this deeply and com-
passionately motivated love as something reserved for Christ. Rather, it 
reveals such love as something embodied by His disciples. To take but 
one example, consider St. Paul. He continually counseled the Christians of 
Ephesus “with tears” for three years (Acts 20:31). He wrote to the Chris-
tians in Corinth “with many tears” that they might come to realize more 
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clearly his abundant love for them (2 Cor 2:4). He wept for the “enemies 
of the cross of Christ: whose end is destruction, whose god is their belly, 
and whose glory is in their shame—who set their mind on earthly things” 
(Phil 3:18–20).6
Moreover, Christ and His disciples not only manifested virtuous affec-
tive dispositions, like deeply and compassionately motivated love, they 
taught the cultivation of such dispositions as an important feature of the 
Christian way of life. For instance, Christ instructed his disciples to strive 
to ameliorate, if not to eradicate, passions that would impede them from 
loving others, like anger (Matt 5:22 ff.), lust (Matt 5:27 ff.), vainglory (Matt 
18:1–4; Mark 9:33–37; Luke 9:46–48), worry (Matt 6:25–34; Luke 12:22–32; 
Matt 13:22; Mark 4:19; Luke 8:14; cp. Matt 11:28–30; Matt 19:16–22; Mark 
10:17–22; Luke 18:18–23), profane fear (Matt 10:26, 28; Luke 12:4), and 
unforgivingness (Matt 18:23–35). With this end in mind, He also taught 
His disciples to handle their material possessions in such a way that they 
would not improperly influence their hearts (Matt 6:19–21). In a similar 
vein, St. Paul encouraged his spiritual children to follow him as he followed 
Christ (cp. 1 Cor 11:1) in eradicating certain affective states and cultivating 
others. For instance, he exhorted them to “crucify all self-indulgent passions 
and desires” (Gal 5:25 JB, emphasis mine), to rid themselves of bitterness, 
anger, and malice (Eph 4:31), and to bear one another’s burdens (Gal 6:2), 
so that they might be able to “put on . . . tender feelings of compassions” 
(Col 4: 12–13 Green’s Interlinear Bible, emphasis mine). Likewise, St. 
James commanded disciples of Christ to control their anger (Jas 1:19 JB) 
and to eradicate bitterness, enviousness, and ambition from their hearts 
(Jas 3:14–15, 4:1–3 JB). This command stemmed from his conviction that 
“genuine religion” includes both performing compassionate actions, like 
visiting “the fatherless and widows in their affliction,” and keeping one-
self “unspotted from the world” (Jas 1:27 JB) in which the self-indulgent 
passions and desires reign (cp. Jas 3:14–15 JB). In essence, both Christ and 
His disciples present cultivating certain kinds of affective-motivational 
dispositions as a central aspect of the Christian way of life.
This twofold teaching of eradicating the “passions” and cultivating 
compassionate love continues to be prominent in the sacred tradition. 
More prominent examples of this can be found, for example, in the Didache, 
in the writings of the desert fathers,7 in St. John Cassian’s “On the Eight 
Vices,”8 in St. Maximos the Confessor’s “Four Hundred Texts on Love,”9 
6St. Paul is an example of a person who is moved by what St. Peter of Damaskos calls a 
“divinely inspired sympathy, on behalf of others” (“A Treasury of Divine Knowledge,” 146). 
As such, he is a kind of secondary exemplar, following Christ, of the kind of compassionate 
love to which Christians are called.
7Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers.
8Cassian, “On the Eight Vices,” 72–93. 
9Maximos the Confessor, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 48–113. This theme re-occurs 
regularly in patristic literature—see, e.g., Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware, Philokalia, vols. 1, 2, 3, 
and 4; Isaac the Syrian, Ascetical Homilies; Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers.
303AFFECTIVE-MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SECOND LOVE COMMAND
and in St. John Damascene’s “On the Virtues and the Vices.”10 The call 
to cultivate a merciful heart, in particular, is also nicely articulated in St. 
Augustine’s City of God, where he exhorts Christians not merely to per-
form works of mercy but to be merciful—that is, to be people who are 
disposed to have “a certain feeling of compassion in our hearts” whereby 
they feel for others and are motivated to act on behalf of their well-being.11
What these examples, both of Christ and of His disciples, suggest is that 
being motivated by a merciful heart is not merely a complementary add-
on to the Christian way of life. In fact, it is an essential aspect of that life, in 
general, and of a properly formed Christian character, in particular. Thus, 
in light of the presentation of Christ-like love in the Christian tradition, 
it would be a mistake to conceive of the second love command merely in 
terms of operations of an agent’s cognitive and volitional faculties. Rather, 
an adequate conception of the love that Christ calls people to have of 
others must also include a description of an agent’s affective-motivational 
dispositions—especially, e.g., the agent’s dispositions to compassion and 
mercy.
I.2 Evidence for a “Merciful Heart”?
Some might worry that the evidence I have cited above does not support 
my thesis. The concern might be expressed roughly as follows: “The ex-
amples that you cite from the Gospels are merely occasions of Christ being 
moved to tears, and the examples that you site from the epistles are, at 
best, recurrent occasions of St. Paul being moved to tears. None of the evi-
dence you have presented is of people being moved so deeply that they 
weep continually, as your thesis suggests, which is good since that would 
be impractical if not impossible.”
This is an understandable worry, but it is one based on a misinterpreta-
tion of St. Isaac’s claim and, consequently, of my thesis. St. Isaac is using 
two phrases in a way that allows for a metaphorical, if not hyperbolic, 
reading, as is common in ancient, near eastern, patristic literature. First, 
he is using the phrase “offers up prayers with tears” in a way that allows 
for a metaphorical reading—e.g., as a reference to a person being moved 
deeply in the kind of way that one is moved when he or she cries, even if 
no tears happen to form in his or her eyes.12 Second, he is using the phrase 
“continually” not to indicate a person’s ongoing occurrent affections (e.g., 
sadness, longing, etc.) but to indicate the kind of affective-motivational 
dispositions a person both has and frequently manifests. Thus, St. Isaac 
is using the term “continually” in a manner similar to the way that St. 
Paul uses the phrase “without ceasing” when he encourages his spiritual 
10John Damascene, “On the Virtues and the Vices,” 333–342. The work has been attributed 
to various authors, but identifying the author of the work is insignificant to my argument. 
11Augustine, City of God, IX.5; cp. Isaac the Syrian, Ascetical Homilies; Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae II-II, Q. 30, a. 1.
12Cp. St. John Climacus’s claim in The Ladder of Divine Ascent regarding sorrow, sighing, 
and heaviness of heart performing the function of tears of repentance (195).
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children to “pray without ceasing” (1 Thes 5:17). Therefore, when St. Isaac 
describes a merciful heart, he does so using descriptively rich, poetical 
rhetoric to portray the Christ-like love that is presented both in sacred 
scripture and in sacred tradition.
I.3 Summary
In summary, the scriptural and patristic evidence suggests that to be a 
person with Christ-like love for one’s neighbor is to be a person with a heart 
that is disposed to being gripped by “strong and vehement mercy” for 
others. Or, in more philosophical prose, being a person who loves his 
neighbor like Christ includes being a person who possesses the kinds of 
affective-motivational dispositions that cause him or her (1) to feel with 
and, more importantly, for his or her neighbors, (2) to desire the good of 
his or her neighbors, and when possible (3) to act on behalf of his or her 
neighbor.13
II. A Philosophical Interpretation of the Second Love Command
Insofar as the lives and teachings of Christ and His followers, as described 
above, are adequate guides to understanding the scope of the second love 
command, we seem to have rather compelling evidence, both from sacred 
scripture and from sacred tradition, that the command has a cognitive, a 
volitional, and an affective-motivational aspect. In light of this evidence, 
Christian philosophers are faced with three important tasks. The first is 
a traditional instance of fides quaerens intellectum: namely, to offer a philo-
sophical explanation of the scriptural and patristic understanding of the 
second love command. The second is a traditional instance of apologetics: 
namely, to offer a defense of this interpretation in light of objections. The 
third is an interdisciplinary, pastoral task concerning moral psychology: 
namely, to offer an account of how to cultivate such a merciful heart.
My aim in this section is to attend to the first of these tasks, in light 
of the first-millennium, philosophical milieu of the scriptural and pa-
tristic writers discussed in Section 1. I will do so in four steps. First, I will 
clarify the traditional Christian14 understanding of people’s obligations 
to cultivate affective-motivational dispositions. Second, I will clarify the 
traditional Christian understanding of God Incarnate as the principal 
13In essence, the affective aspect of the kind of love that Christ commands Christians to 
cultivate, on my account, is akin to what Dan Batson calls “empathic concern” and what a 
number of other contemporary psychologists call “sympathy”—see Batson, “These Things 
Called Empathy” and “The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis”; cp. Hoffman, Empathy and 
Moral Development. It is not a specific emotional state with a particular valence, but a disposi-
tion to feel with and for others, such that we are naturally caused, e.g., not only to mourn 
with those who rightly mourn and to rejoice with those who rightly rejoice (Rom 12:15), but 
also to mourn for those who wrongly rejoice (cp. Luke 19:41–42) and to rejoice for those who 
wrongly mourn.
14I will be using the phrase “traditional Christianity” and related phrases to refer to the 
“mother tradition” of Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism—i.e., 
the first-millennium “Church of the Seven Councils.” 
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exemplar of virtue. Third, I will clarify how it is that we can ascribe affec-
tive-motivational dispositions to God Incarnate. Fourth, I will draw upon 
these clarifications to explain the types of affective-motivational disposi-
tions that Christ calls people to cultivate in the second love command.
II.1 First Clarification: Commands regarding Affective Faculties
The thought of commanding a person to perform a bodily act or an act 
of will is a common feature of contemporary moral discourse. To some, 
however, the thought of commanding a person to cultivate certain affec-
tive-motivational dispositions might not seem to be. Consequently, for 
such readers, the traditional Christian understanding of Christ’s second 
love command as having an affective-motivational aspect might seem 
odd. As I will show presently, however, this was not the case for those 
whose minds and modes of discourse were formed by the philosophical 
milieu of the scriptural and patristic writers.
Philosophers from Plato and Aristotle in Greece to Cicero and Seneca 
in Rome, as well as their medieval followers conceived of ethics in Greco-
Roman aretaic categories.15 The general contours of their line of thought 
are widely familiar, but let me review them briefly to bring a few of the 
most salient features into focus. The principal conceptual foci were the 
end, or telos, of human life (i.e., happiness) and the excellent states of the 
soul by which people attain their end (i.e., virtues).16 The soul was thought 
to be composed of parts—rational and irrational.17 Each of these parts 
was thought to have its own distinctive virtues—intellectual and moral.18 
Although moral virtue itself was thought to be a state of the soul, both ac-
tions and feelings were thought to be properly related to moral virtue. For 
instance, Aristotle says,
Virtue of character . . . is about feelings and actions, and these admit of excess, 
deficiency, and an intermediate condition. We can be afraid, for instance, or 
be confident, or have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, or in general feel 
pleasure or pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well. 
But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right 
people, for the right end, and in the right way is the intermediate and best condition, 
and this is proper to virtue. Similarly, actions also admit of excess, deficiency, 
and an intermediate condition. Now virtue is about feelings and actions, in 
which excess and deficiency are in error and incur blame, whereas the inter-
mediate condition is correct and wins praise, which are both proper to virtue.19
15The point I am developing here follows Watson’s suggestion that we can praise or blame 
moral agents from an “aretaic perspective,” assessing the extent to which they have suc-
ceeded or failed with respect to standards of virtue, or excellence (arete). See Watson, “Two 
Faces of Responsibility”; see also Adams, “Involuntary Sins,” and Anscombe, “Modern 
Moral Philosophy.” 
16See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II.vi.15 [1107a]. 
17See, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus [especially 419a–445e]; Republic; cp. Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, III.10–12; VII.1–10 [1117b–1119b; 1145a–1152a]; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II.xxi.
18See, e.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.13–II.i [1102a–1103a].
19Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.vi.10–12 [1106b], emphasis mine.
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Aristotle’s claims about the relationship between virtue and affective 
states are not idiosyncratic; they are implied by the aretaic categories he 
employs, as follows. On the Greco-Roman conception of human excellence 
described above, a fully virtuous person has both intellectual and moral 
virtues. In other words, a fully virtuous person has a soul that is excel-
lent with respect to both its rational and its irrational parts. The irrational 
aspect of the soul is the locus of affective-motivational dispositions. There-
fore, a fully virtuous person is one who has excellent dispositions even 
in this part of his or her soul. Thus, to those who are familiar with these 
Greco-Roman aretaic categories, it would be quite natural to conceive of 
a fully virtuous person as one who has excellent affective-motivational 
dispositions.
What’s more, this kind of conception of the relation between virtue and 
affective-motivational dispositions was not limited to the Academic and 
Peripatetic schools of philosophy. In a related vein, the early Stoics con-
ceived of apatheia as a two-fold virtue that resulted in agents who would 
not experience some affective states—namely, pathe, like anger, delight at 
the misery of others, fear, and sorrow—but would experience others—
namely, eupathe, like wishing, joy, and watchfulness.20 Since they regarded 
virtue not as an accident but as an achievement, they exhorted people 
to eradicate certain affective-motivational dispositions and to cultivate 
others. For instance, in De Officiis, Cicero instructs his readers to eradicate 
anger21 and presents himself as a model of how to deal with grief, by strug-
gling against it.22 In essence, he exhorts his readers to cultivate communitas, 
“the deepest feeling in our nature.”23 Seneca’s “On Tranquillity of Mind” 
is a similar kind of work. Its focal point is the dispositional state in which 
the mind always pursues a steady and favorable course, is well-disposed 
towards itself, and views its condition with joy.24 The purpose of the work 
is summarized nicely in the final paragraph. Seneca says,
Here are the rules, my dearest Serenus, by which you may preserve tran-
quillity, by which you may restore it, by which you may resist the vices that 
steal upon it unawares. Yet be sure of this—none of them is strong enough 
to guard a thing so frail unless we surround the wavering mind with earnest 
and unceasing care.25
The reason that Stoics like Cicero and Seneca (1) exhorted people to 
eradicate certain affective-motivational dispositions and to cultivate 
others and (2) provided them rules for doing so is because they regarded 
20See, e.g., Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 114–115; Cottingham, Philosophy and 
the Good Life, 55–57; Pereboom, “Stoic Therapy in Descartes and Spinoza,” 594–598; Vitz, 
Reforming the Art of Living, 43. 
21Cicero, De Officiis, I.89. 
22Cicero, De Officiis, II.2.
23Cicero, De Officiis, II.159.
24Seneca, “On Tranquillity of Mind,” II.4.
25Seneca, “On Tranquillity of Mind,” XVII.12.
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the cultivation of such dispositions as a human duty (officium). Thus, to 
those who are familiar with Stoic moral philosophy, it would quite natural 
to conceive of a fully virtuous person as one with duties (officiis) to culti-
vate virtuous affective-motivational dispositions.
Given that the Christian scriptural and patristic writers of the first 
millennium were familiar both with Greco-Roman aretaic categories and 
with Stoic moral philosophy, it is not at all surprising that they appro-
priated themes from these traditions to explain the ascetic life by which 
their disciples should pursue the scriptural commands to eradicate some 
affective-motivational dispositions and to cultivate others. I mentioned 
some examples of this in passing in Section I. Given my aims in this sec-
tion, I will return to them now, highlighting in more detail examples of 
the traditional Christian appropriation of (1) the nature of the soul and, 
consequently, of virtue, (2) ascetic labors, and the need (3) to eradicate 
some affective-motivational dispositions and (4) to cultivate others.
The Natures of the Soul and, Consequently, of Virtue. Some of the clearest 
and most helpful expressions of the traditional Christian appropriation of 
the ancient Greek—and, more specifically, the tripartite—conception of 
the soul come from St. John Damascene, St. John Cassian, and St. Maximos 
the Confessor. St. John Damascence is particularly explicit. In “On the Vir-
tues and the Vices,” he says, “In order to make it easier to recognize the 
passions in terms of the tripartite division of the soul we will classify them 
briefly. The soul has three aspects: the intelligent, the incensive, and the de-
siring aspect.” He then goes on to discuss the virtues and the vices within 
this psychological framework.26 St. John Cassian uses a similar approach 
in “On the Eight Vices,” a work from which Christians later developed 
the “seven deadly sins.”27 St. Maximos the Confessor does likewise in his 
“Four Hundred Texts on Love.” He notes that “[s]ome passions pertain 
the soul’s incensive power, and others to its desiring aspect.”28 He goes on 
to explain the proper ordering of each of these aspects of the soul,
A soul’s motivation is rightly ordered when its desiring power is subordi-
nated to self-control, when its incensive power rejects hatred and cleaves 
to love, and when its power of intelligence, through prayer and spiritual 
contemplation, advances toward God.29
In essence, his discussion of the parts of the soul and their corresponding 
cardinal virtues is explicitly consistent with the tradition of the Greco-
Roman aretaic framework.30 What is particularly interesting, for present 
purposes, is not merely that he endorses the Greco-Roman aretaic 
conception of the soul and its virtues but that he says explicitly, “[T]he 
26Damascence, “On the Virtues and the Vices,” 337. 
27Cassian, “On the Eight Vices,” 72–93. 
28Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 60.
29Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 102.
30See, e.g., Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 78.
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Lord has given us commandments which correspond to the powers of 
the soul.”31
What are we commanded to do? We are commanded to engage in ascetic 
labors so that we can eradicate some affective-motivational dispositions, 
cultivate others, and ultimately enter more fully into union with God.
Ascetic Labors. The need to engage in ascetic labors for the purpose of 
healing the disorders of the soul is highlighted frequently in Christian 
patristic literature. For present purposes, I will focus on some examples 
from the sayings of the desert fathers and, again, from St. Maximos that 
highlight the need for traditional ascetic labors, like prayer, fasting, and 
almsgiving. Abba Nilus identifies prayer as “the seed of gentleness and 
the absence of anger . . . [and] a remedy against grief and depression.”32 
Abba Poemen similarly identifies prayer as a means of combating anger 
and lust.33 Abba John the Dwarf identifies fasting as a means of combating 
the passions in general. He says, “If a king wanted to take possession of 
his enemy’s city, he would begin by cutting off the water and the food 
and so his enemies, dying of hunger, would submit to him. It is the same 
with the passions of the flesh: if a man goes about fasting and hungry 
the enemies of his soul grow weak.”34 St. Maximos explains the role of 
prayer, fasting, and almsgiving in the battle against the passions. He says, 
“Almsgiving heals the soul’s incensive power; fasting withers sensual de-
sire; prayer purifies the intellect and prepares it for the contemplation of 
created beings. . . . Gentleness keeps the soul’s incensive power in a calm 
state; humility frees the intellect from conceit and self-esteem.”35
Eradicating Affective-Motivational Dispositions. The author of The Didache 
reiterates the scriptural commands regarding the passions which Chris-
tians are called to eradicate:
My child, flee from evil of every kind, and from everything resembling it. 
Do not become angry . . . Do not be jealous or quarrelsome or hot-tempered 
. . . do not be lustful . . . Do not be avaricious . . . Do not be arrogant or evil-
minded.36
The desert fathers and mothers do likewise. Abba Poemen claims, “God 
has given this way of life to Israel: to abstain from everything which is 
contrary to nature, that is to say, anger, fits of passion, jealousy, hatred 
and slandering the brethren.”37 Abba John the Dwarf, Abba Isidore the 
Priest, and Abba Nilus make similar claims.38 St. John Cassian notes the 
31Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 62, emphasis mine.
32Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 153.
33Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 176; cp. 179, 92.
34Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 86. 
35Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 62; cp. Damascene, “On the Virtues and 
Vices,” 333–342. 
36Lightfoot and Harmer, The Apostolic Fathers, 150–151.
37Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 176; cp. 179.
38Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 86, 96, 153, 155; cp. 156.
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particularly acute need to eradicate gluttony, lust, avarice, anger, dejec-
tion, listlessness, self-esteem, and pride.39
Eradicating the “passions” is not an end. It is merely a necessary pre-
condition for cultivating other affective-motivational dispositions.
Cultivating Affective-Motivational Dispositions. The Christian patristic 
tradition speaks of the need to cultivate fear of God40 and compunction 
for sins, but more importantly, it speaks of the need to cultivate inner 
peace (hesychia) and dispassion (apatheia), as Abba Doulas, Abba Rufus, 
and St. Maximos suggest.41 The goal, however, is to reach the height of 
dispassion and to be perfected in love.42 St. Maximos highlights this point 
nicely, in the language of the Greco-Roman aretaic framework when he 
says, “When a man’s intellect is constantly with God, his desire grows 
beyond all measure into an intense longing for God and his incensiveness 
is completely transformed into divine love.”43
The point of these examples is not to suggest that the Christian patristic 
tradition provides a faithful interpretation of Plato or Aristotle or Cicero 
or Seneca. Rather, it is to show that the Christian scriptural and patristic 
tradition appropriated Greco-Roman aretaic categories to explain what 
they understood to be divinely-ordained officiis, to borrow a term from 
Cicero, or “commandments,” to use the language of St. Maximos. In other 
words, in the mindset of the Christian scriptural and patristic tradition, 
people have officiis (i.e., duties) or obligations to cultivate certain affective-
motivational dispositions.44
Given that such obligations concern virtue (arete), I will refer to them as 
aretaic obligations. Thus, in keeping with the scriptural and patristic tradi-
tion, as described above, an “aretaic obligation” is an ethical imperative 
both to cultivate virtues and to perform genuinely virtuous actions. To 
the extent that someone satisfies such imperatives, he or she is the proper 
object of moral approbation, and to the extent that someone fails to satisfy 
such imperatives, he or she is the proper object of moral disapprobation. 
Therefore, on this traditional Christian account, the “oughts” implied by 
aretaic obligations are genuine moral imperatives;45 they are not merely 
39Cassian, “On the Eight Vices,” 72–93. 
40See, e.g., Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 62, 156. 
41See, e.g., Desert Fathers, Sayings of the Desert Fathers, 55, 210; Maximos, “Four Hundred 
Texts on Love,” 53, 56. 
42Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 70.
43Maximos, “Four Hundred Texts on Love,” 73; cp. 82.
44For those who might have Kantian-inspired worries, two points of clarification might 
be helpful here. First, notice that an aretaic obligation to cultivate an affective-motivational 
disposition is akin to the kind of “conditional duty” to sympathize with others that Kant 
describes in Metaphysics of Morals II.i.1, §34, as noted above. Second, if the Kantian view is at 
odds with the traditional Christian view, it would seem more likely to be at odds not with 
whether we have obligations to cultivate certain affective-motivational dispositions but with 
the extent to which acting from those dispositions has moral worth.
45Cp. Adams, “Involuntary Sins”; Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”; Watson “Two 
Faces of Responsibility.”
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the kind of proper-function “oughts” that are not subject to moral praise 
or blame.46
II.2 Second Clarification: Virtue as Likeness to God Incarnate
Understanding the philosophical milieu of the scriptural and patristic 
writers helps to elucidate why traditional Christians recognize in the 
second love command a call to cultivate certain kinds of affective-motiva-
tional dispositions. To understand the specific nature of that call, however, 
requires some reflection on the significance of the Incarnation for the na-
ture of virtue and, hence, of ethical obligations, as I will now explain.
One key to recognizing the significance of the Incarnation for the nature 
and scope of aretaic obligations is to understand the traditional Greco-
Roman doctrine that virtue is likeness to God. As a touchstone and point 
of departure, let’s consider the doctrine as presented in Plato’s works.47 
In Laws, Plato claims—contra Parmenides—that it is God, not man, that 
is the measure of all things.48 Thus, on Plato’s account, God is the “mea-
sure of” virtue such that a person who strives to be virtuous strives to 
be as much like God as he is able, as he claims in the Republic and sug-
gests in Phaedrus.49 Insofar as living virtuously is an end of life, human 
beings ought to “escape to heaven” by becoming like God, as he claims in 
Theaetetus.50 Thus, according to Plato, human beings ought, insofar as they 
are able, to strive to acquire virtues and in so doing to become like God, as 
he suggests in Phaedo.51
How does understanding this traditional Greco-Roman teaching that 
virtue is likeness to God help us to understand the significance of the 
Incarnation for the nature and scope of aretaic obligations? I will explain 
this in more detail shortly, but by way of overview, here is the gist of the 
idea. Traditional Christianity rejects various theological, cosmological, and 
psychological elements of Greco-Roman philosophy—e.g., the polytheism 
of the ancient poets, the naturalistic theology of the Stoics, the Aristotelian 
conception of the universe as eternally existing, and the notion that the 
soul is imprisoned in the body,52 etc. It does not, however, reject this Greco-
Roman ethical doctrine. Rather, it rejects the Greco-Roman interpretation 
of this doctrine. In essence, traditional Christianity is willing to grant that 
46Cp. Wolterstorff, Justice in Love. Some might be tempted to claim that aretaic obligations 
are not “real moral” obligations. I think this is misguided, but a defense of the nature of that 
which is “really” moral or “really” ethical is not essential for my argument. For my purposes, 
it is sufficient to show that on the traditional Christian account, as described above, people 
have officiis, or duties, or obligations of the sort that I will refer to as “aretaic obligations.” 
47My brief summary of virtue as likeness to God in the ancients in this paragraph is in-
debted to Daniel Russell’s helpful presentation in Russell, “Virtue as ‘Likeness to God’ in 
Plato and Seneca.” 
48Plato, Laws VI [716c–d]. 
49Plato, Republic X [613a–b]; cf. Plato, Phaedrus [248a].
50Plato, Theaetetus [176a].
51Plato, Phaedo [80a–84b].
52See, e.g., Plato, Phaedo [82d–e]. 
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philosophers of Greece and Rome were right in characterizing virtue as 
likeness to God. What it denies is that they were right to characterize God 
as they did. On the traditional Christian account, virtue is in fact likeness 
not simply to God but to God Incarnate—likeness, that is, to the embodied 
second Person of the Trinity. Thus, rather than conceiving of virtue as 
likeness, e.g., to Plato’s Good or to the Stoic’s Zeus, traditional Christians 
conceive of virtue as likeness to Christ, Who is not only fully God but also 
fully human.
Having provided some sense of the essence of the traditional Christian 
understanding of the claim that virtue is likeness to God Incarnate, let me 
begin to explain the view in more detail. As I noted above, in the ethical 
frame of mind that shaped the discourse of the scriptural and patristic 
writers, virtues are excellent qualities of a kind of being. More specifi-
cally, virtues are those qualities by which individual members of a kind 
attain the telos of their kind. How does one determine the telos of a kind? 
Aristotle provides a characteristic expression of the philosophical milieu 
of the scriptural and patristic writers when he claims that “the function 
[telos] of a kind of thing is the same in kind as the function of an excel-
lent individual of that kind.”53 That is, on the Greco-Roman view that 
informed traditional Christian ethical discourse, one identifies the telos of 
a kind of thing by observing an excellent member of that kind. In other 
words, in the ethical framework of Greco-Roman philosophy and of the 
scriptural and patristic writers, one identifies the telos of a kind of thing by 
identifying an exemplar of that kind.54
Whether the kind of classical approach to virtue ethics that I have 
described above employs a satisfactory methodological strategy is not es-
sential to my argument. What is essential to my argument is the fact that 
Greco-Roman virtue theories endorsed this methodological strategy and 
traditional Christianity did likewise, as follows. On the traditional Chris-
tian account, Christ is not only fully God but also fully human. Insofar as 
He is “fully human,” He is neither some kind of super-human demigod 
nor merely one particular good human being among others. Rather, He 
is sinless and, hence, the “Just One” (ton dikaion) (cp. Acts 3:14; 7:52). That 
is, Jesus Christ is the ethically55 excellent member of the human kind par 
53Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.vii.13–17 [1098a]. This idea is not unique to Aristotle. 
One sees something similar in Plato’s references to “the Just Man” and in the Stoics refer-
ences to “the Sage,” as well as in Confucian references to “sages” and “gentlemen”—see, e.g., 
Confucius, The Analects; Mencius, Mengzi. In this way, classical conceptions of virtue ethics 
are fundamentally (in Chisholm’s terms) “particularist” rather than “methodist,” insofar as 
they define moral exemplars by ostension rather than by identifying and applying a list of 
criteria (cp. Chisholm, “The Problem of The Criterion.”). This methodological approach dif-
fers from that of many modern ethical theories that begin with a criterion, or set of criteria, 
for identifying right action, then develop an account of virtues, then try to determine if there 
exist any persons who exemplify the virtues.
54Absent the Incarnation, this seems to present a significant problem for virtue ethics (cp. 
Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory).
55Note that the type of excellence in question is that of the soul, not that of the body.
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excellence. Hence, it is Christ that is “the measure” both of happiness and 
of the virtues.56 Thus, the traditional Christian scriptural and patristic 
conception of virtue bears a subtle relationship to the systems of Greek 
and Roman philosophy from which it appropriates various themes. The 
traditional Christian view affirms the Aristotelian doctrine that human 
excellence is fixed by the kind to which we belong, but it denies the Ar-
istotelian teaching that human beings are merely members of a natural 
kind. Rather, on the traditional Christian conception, human beings are 
members of a natural kind in which each member can be divinized insofar 
as he or she is in union with God.57 This teaching is evinced in the ancient 
Christian aphorism that what Christ is by nature, each Christian is called 
to be by grace. In this way, the traditional Christian view affirms something 
akin to, though clearly not identical to, the Platonic doctrine that virtue 
is likeness to God. On the traditional Christian view, virtue is likeness to 
God Incarnate—Jesus Christ, in Whom human nature is exemplified in-
sofar as it is divinized. It is this instance of human nature that reveals our 
aretaic obligations, including our obligations to cultivate certain affective-
motivational dispositions.
II.3 Third Clarification: The Affective-Motivational Dispositions of God Incarnate
At first glance, the claim that God Incarnate exemplifies our aretaic obliga-
tions to cultivate certain affective-motivational dispositions might seem 
rather problematic for the following reason. Against those who worshiped 
the Homeric deities, Plato and like-minded ancient Greco-Roman philoso-
phers asserted that because God is incorporeal and immutable, He can 
neither suffer, nor have affective-motivational dispositions, nor (espe-
cially) have painful affective states like anger or jealousy. Since traditional 
Christianity endorses similar claims, one might reasonably worry that 
there is a problem ascribing affective-motivational dispositions to God. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the traditional Christian 
conception of Divine impassibility has to be interpreted not simply in 
light of philosophical analysis but also, more importantly, in light of the 
distinctively Christian conception of God, especially the doctrines of the 
Trinity and the Incarnation. It is in light of these teachings that one can 
rightly speak of God as having affective-motivational dispositions, as I 
will argue presently.
The distinctively Christian, Trinitarian conception of God, according to 
which God is one with respect to essence (ousia) and three with respect to 
persons (hypostases), requires more nuanced assessments of divine predi-
cation. For instance, when assessing what one can predicate of God, the 
doctrine of the Trinity requires the identification of the subject of which 
a property, or set of properties, is being predicated. That is, for any given 
56Cp. Plato, Laws VI [716c–d]; Republic X [613a–b]; Phaedrus [248a]; Theaetetus [176a]; 
Phaedo [80a–84b]; as well as Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7.xiv, as noted above. 
57Marissa Espinoza and I explain this more fully in Vitz and Espinoza, “The Divine 
Energies and the ‘End of Human Life.’”
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case of divine predication, one must identify whether one is predicating 
the property, or set of properties, of the divine essence (ousia) or of a divine 
person (hypostasis), and if of a divine person, then of which.
Consider, for instance, the claim that God suffered on the cross. Can 
suffered on the cross be predicated of God? Three groups of people clearly 
denied that it could, for different reasons. One group, the gnostically-
inclined Docetists, said that the answer is “no” because although Jesus 
Christ is God, He is not a human being. Thus, they claimed, despite ap-
pearances to the contrary, God did not suffer on the cross. A second group, 
the Arians, said that the answer is “no” because Jesus Christ is not of the 
same substance (ousia) as God the Father and, hence, is not really God. 
Thus, they claimed, it is not right to say that God suffered on the cross. 
A third group, the Nestorians, tried to find an alternative that would sat-
isfy these kind of Gnostic and Arian concerns by arguing that in the body 
crucified on Calvary, there were two persons (hypostases): Jesus, the Son of 
Mary, and the second Person of the Trinity, the Son of God.58 Thus, they 
claimed, although it would be right to say that a human person, Jesus, suf-
fered on the cross, it would not be right to say that God, the Second Person 
of the Trinity, suffered on the cross.
None of these answers, however, is consistent with traditional Christi-
anity. Contra Docetism, traditional Christianity affirms that Jesus Christ is 
truly a human being. Contra Arianism, traditional Christianity affirms that 
Jesus Christ is truly God. Contra Nestorianism, traditional Christianity 
Jesus Christ is one person. In the fuller development of its anti-Nestorian 
view, traditional Christianity also argues (1) contra Monophysitism, that 
Jesus Christ has two natures (phuseis), (2) contra Monoenergism, that He 
has two kinds of energies (energeiai), or faculties,59 corresponding to his 
two natures, and (3) contra Monothelitism, that Jesus Christ has two wills 
(thelemata), corresponding to his two natures and two kinds of energies.60
In short, on the traditional Christian account, one person suffered on Cal-
vary: Jesus Christ. Insofar as He is fully God, that one person has a divine 
nature, divine energies, and a divine will. Moreover, insofar as He is fully 
58It might be helpful to make two observations on this point. The first is that the historical 
debates about whether Christians ought to refer to Mary as (1) the Theotokos, or Mother of 
God, or as (2) the Christotokos, or Mother of Christ, is inherently and deeply Christological. 
The second is that the Church’s liturgical and doctrinal commitments to honor Mary as the 
Theotokos express an explicitly anti-Nestorian Christology.
59St. John Damascene distinguishes a number of different uses of the term “energy.” For 
present purposes, it will suffice to highlight three. He says that the term is used to refer to (1) 
a faculty, or power, such as the will (thelesis), by which a being moves itself, (2) the activities 
of these faculties, or powers, like specific acts of will such as wish (boulesis) or use (chresis), 
and (3) natural passions, like hunger and thirst. Thus, the term is used to refer to faculties, to 
activities, and to passions that are in accordance with the natural function of these faculties. 
See, e.g., Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, II.23. I am focusing on the first of these uses since 
that is the one relevant to understanding the term “Monoenergism.” 
60In “The Divine Energies and the ‘End of Human Life,’” Marissa Espinoza and I explain 
some of the implications of these Christological details both for an understanding of human 
nature and, consequently, for ethics.
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human that one person has a human nature, human energies, and a human 
will. Therefore, since it is persons—rather than natures, energies, or wills—
that suffer, it is right to say that God suffered on the cross. What might have 
seemed unthinkable prior to the Incarnation has become thinkable there-
after. More importantly, for present purposes, what might have seemed 
unspeakable prior to the Incarnation has become speakable thereafter.61
With these traditional Christian clarifications in mind, we can resolve 
the apparent problem with which we began. Just as we can properly 
predicate suffering of God Incarnate, in the person of Christ, we can also 
predicate affective-motivational states and dispositions of God Incarnate, 
in the person of Christ. To deny this would be to deny traditional Chris-
tology. Thus, God Incarnate not only has but, more importantly for the 
purpose of my argument, exemplifies affective-motivational dispositions.62
II.4 A Philosophical Interpretation of the Second Love Command
So far in this section, I have offered three clarifications concerning tradi-
tional Christianity in light of the philosophical milieu of the scriptural and 
patristic writers. First, people have aretaic obligations to cultivate certain 
affective-motivational dispositions. Second, the principal exemplar of 
such dispositions is God Incarnate, as revealed in Christ. Third, we can as-
cribe such dispositions to God Incarnate insofar as Christ is both fully God 
and, more importantly for our purposes, fully human. I will now draw 
upon these clarifications to explain the types of affective-motivational dis-
positions that Christ calls people to cultivate in the second love command.
The traditional Christian affirmation of Christ’s humanity—especially 
the rejections of Monoenergism and of Monotheletism—entails that He 
has not only divine energies, or faculties, but also human energies, or 
faculties. In short, it entails not merely that Christ is human but also that 
He is fully human. This means that Christ has a tripartite human psyche, 
consisting of a rational faculty, and two irrational faculties. Thus, it entails 
that with respect to his humanity, Christ has a noetic faculty, an incensive 
faculty, and an appetitive faculty. In principle, each of these faculties can 
function excellently or poorly—i.e., virtuously or viciously. Since Christ is 
sinless and, thus, entirely morally praiseworthy, it follows that even His 
irrational faculties—i.e., his incensive and appetitive energies—function 
excellently. Therefore, on the traditional Christian account, Christ not 
only manifests but exemplifies both intellectual virtues, like wisdom, and 
moral virtues, like courage and temperance.
Moreover, moral virtues63 are “about feelings” such that the person who 
possesses these character traits has the right kinds of feelings “at the right 
61Thus, the Incarnation changed the way that human beings could depict God both in 
language, as I have noted here, and in images, as St. John Damascene argues in his defense 
of icons (Damascence, Three Treatises on the Divine Images).
62Cp. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory; Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory. 
63Since they are not essential to my argument, I will set aside the intellectual virtues for 
the time being.
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times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, 
and in the right way,” as is “proper to virtue.”64 Thus, on the traditional 
Christian account, Christ has not only virtuous thoughts and volitions but 
also virtuous affective-motivational dispositions. Since virtue is likeness 
to God Incarnate, it follows that human beings have aretaic obligations to 
have not only virtuous thoughts and volitions but also virtuous affective-
motivational dispositions. Thus, insofar as people are called to manifest 
Christ-like love, they are called not only to think of and to act on behalf of 
their neighbor as Christ does, but also to feel with, to feel for, and to desire 
the good for their neighbor as Christ does.
In essence, the obligations implied by the second love command are 
not limited to a particular subset of energies, or faculties, such that, e.g., 
a person merely has a duty to conform his or her mind and will to God’s 
laws. Rather, the obligations implied by the second love command are 
for the whole person, such that he or she has a duty to unite all of his or 
her energies with God, living thereby in continual synergy with Christ—
literally, energizing with God Incarnate. In other words, the second love 
command implies that people have obligations to be like St. Paul who de-
scribes himself as “striving according to His [i.e., Christ’s] working, who 
works in me mightily” (Col 1:29 NKJV; cp. Gal 2:20).65 Insofar as they are 
able to do so, they are able to love God with all their heart and all their 
souls (Matt 22:37; Mark 12:29; Luke 12:27) and, consequently, to embody 
the merciful character of God Incarnate.
II.5 Summary
In sum, the second love command calls for people to cultivate both the 
virtues and the properly related affective-motivational dispositions that 
naturally manifest themselves in caring actions. In other words, the second 
love command calls for people to strive to cultivate not merely cognitive 
and volitional excellence but also the kinds of affective-motivational 
excellence exemplified by Christ in the Gospels and reflected in the lives 
of His disciples, as described above. More precisely, it calls for people to 
strive to cultivate hearts that are, in the words of St. Isaac of Syria, gripped 
by “strong and vehement mercy,” such that they are disposed (1) to feel 
64This clarification is helpful for understanding the scope of the second love command. 
Christ is calling people to cultivate affective-motivational dispositions to feel deeply with 
their “neighbors,” that is those within (what Hume calls) their “narrow circle” of social in-
tercourse, as illustrated in the Parable of the Good Samaritan. He is not, e.g., calling people to 
have intense affective responses to every human being who is currently suffering.
65For excellent explanations of the divine energies, see Bradshaw, “The Vision of God 
in Philo of Alexandria”; Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West; Bradshaw, “The Concept of 
the Divine Energies”; and Bradshaw, “The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies.” For 
philosophical accounts of human union with the divine energies, see Jacobs, “An Eastern 
Orthodox Conception of Theosis and Human Nature”; and Vitz and Espinoza, “The Divine 
Energies and the ‘End of Human Life.’” For patristic and theological accounts, see Lossky, 
The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church; Lossky, “Redemption and Deification”; Maximos, 
“Four Hundred Texts on Love”; and Maximos, On the Difficulties of the Church Fathers: The 
Ambigua, vols. 1 and 2.
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with and for their neighbors, (2) to desire the good of their neighbors, and 
when possible (3) to act with care on behalf of their neighbors.
III. Conclusion
In the foregoing sections, I examined evidence from sacred scripture and 
sacred tradition concerning the kind of love implied by the second love 
command, as evinced by the lives of Christ and his disciples. I then offered 
a fides quaerens intellectum philosophical explanation of this scriptural and 
patristic understanding of the command. To the extent that I have suc-
ceeded, I have shown that Christ calls people to strive to cultivate merciful 
hearts disposed with the kind of affective depth described by St. Isaac of 
Syria in his 71st ascetical homily—i.e., ones that are disposed to becoming 
inflamed, such that they are gripped by “strong and vehement mercy.” 
To have made a compelling case that people have aretaic obligations of 
this sort is an important accomplishment, both in and of itself and, more 
importantly, for the philosophical work that it invites.
Let me close by making three brief observations about the philosophical 
work that remains to be done, in light of the three tasks I identified at the 
beginning of Section II. First, the kind of love that Christians are obligated 
to strive to cultivate is that of which traditional Christianity, in general, 
and the neptic fathers and mothers, in particular, speak repeatedly. So, 
the position for which I have argued is not an innovative one. Rather, it is 
a corrective one that calls us to re-examine our heritage and to re-articu-
late our ethical obligations both in light of and in terms of that heritage. 
Second, the philosophical explanation of the scriptural and patristic un-
derstanding of the command that I have provided faces challenges on a 
number of fronts—e.g., metaphysical, epistemological, and metaethical. 
So, as one would rightly expect of any philosophical thesis, it will require 
a multi-faceted defense. Third, the work to which Christian philosophers 
are obliged is not, and ought not be, merely theoretical. However impor-
tant such work might be, eventually Christian philosophy must also tend 
to the interdisciplinary, pastoral work that helps people live well.66 To the 
extent that Christian philosophy tends to neglect these tasks or perhaps 
even to denigrate affective-motivational aspects of the second love com-
mand, it will tend to promote a misunderstanding of human nature or, 
worse yet, to support ecclesiastical cultures that fail to lead people into the 
rich depths of Christian salvation.67
Azusa Pacific University
66For examples of interesting philosophical and theological work being developed along 
these lines, see Cuneo, Ritualized Faith and Fagerberg, On Liturgical Asceticism. 
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